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Economic Internationalism in a Nationalistic World 
By GEORGE P. AULD 
Partner, Haskins & Sells, New York 
Address delivered at the Third General Session of the 
TWENTY-SECOND 
NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE CONVENTION 
Houston, Texas, November 20, 1935 
E C O N O M I C I N T E R N A T I O N A L I S M IN A 
N A T I O N A L I S T I C W O R L D 
By G E O R G E P. A U L D 
Partner, Haskins & Sells 
Recent trends in the balance of international payments of the 
United States and of other countries disclose important new phases 
of the long drawn out world crisis. They are faithful reflections of 
changes in the domestic conditions of the nations, transmitted from 
one country to another through the quick and sensitive action of the 
international exchanges. Recoveries, on the whole world-wide, have 
been registered in productive activity and, to a moderate extent, in 
the physical quantity of world trade. The unsettled state of world 
monetary affairs, unmarked for the moment by any startling change, 
continues to operate as a depressant, while international political fac-
tors have in the past few months taken a decided turn for the worse. 
These are mixed trends. In the early summer the substantial recov-
eries in production which had occurred since last year, and which 
have since continued, were described by the author of the most com-
prehensive recent survey of world affairs as "superficial rather than 
fundamental"1 and the uneven rate of recovery was characterized as 
the cause of increased "strain on a precariously maintained interna-
tional equilibrium."2 
The international transactions of the United States during the 
first half of 1935, as determined or estimated by the Department of 
Commerce forcibly indicated the demoralization of our agriculture, 
the increased activity, present and prospective, of our manufactur-
ing industries, and the tensity of the political situation in Europe. 
There was a continuance of the serious contraction of our raw cotton 
exports which were less by $39,000,000 than in the first half of 1934, 
and of lard exports, which were less by $7,000,000 or 47%.3 These 
decreases were slightly more than offset by a substantial further ex-
1 World Economic Survey 1934-35—by J . B. Condliffe—League of Nations, 
Geneva, August 15, 1935, quoting this comment from Report of the Director of 
International Labour Conference, 19th Session, Geneva, 1935. 
2 The words quoted were written by Mr. Condliffe in May, 1935. In a final 
chapter written in July, 1935, he took a somewhat more optimistic view. 
3 In quantity the lard exports fell off from 274,000,000 lbs. to 68,000,000 
lbs., or 75%. 
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pansion in our exports of automobiles, machinery and other manu-
factured goods. Total exports including foodstuffs decreased $12,-
000,000 or 1.2%, while commodity imports shot up 15%. 
Of the increase of $153,000,000 in imports for consumption, over 
half was in foodstuffs and nearly 40% was in raw or semi-manu-
factured materials for our manufacturing industries. We took a little 
more coffee and a great deal more cane sugar, cocoa, bananas and 
tea; we also brought in large quantities of corn, wheat, feeds, cattle, 
meat and meat products, the importations of which should normally 
be small or nil. The increased imports of materials for industry re-
flected as to rubber a decrease of 11½% in tonnage at an increased 
dollar value of 22½%, but as to most of the import items represented 
increased quantities, including substantial increases, in most cases 
at lower prices, in such important raw materials as tin, copper, 
nickel, chrome, shoe leather, burlaps, wool, raw silk, boards, shingles, 
creosote and fertilizers. There was a continuance of the heavy in-
ward movement of gold from Europe, which in 1934 was attributed 
to return of American flight capital. The gold movement has con-
tinued this fall, apparently now representing European capital seek-
ing safety in a land of peace and stable institutions. 
Looking at the over-all condensed figures we find that the import 
of gold from January to June, 1935, amounted to $802,000,000, of 
silver $79,000,000, and of currency $11,000,000. Added to these 
inward bullion and currency movements on the debit side we had 
an adverse balance of services and interest on capital for the half-
year of $39,000,000, which was about three times the 1934 esti-
mate at the half-year mark. On the credit side, our merchandise ex-
port balance for the half-year of only $29,000,000 was startlingly low, 
representing a decrease from the 1934 half-yearly figure of 83%. 
This reflected in part the wearing off of the favorable price differ-
ential for our exports created when the dollar was devalued, in 
part the heavy importation of foodstuffs and in part the increased 
import of raw materials, the last-named movement probably fore-
shadowing, as was earlier the case in England, a further expansion 
in the export of manufactures. 
On these figures, our small export surplus of goods was, in effect, 
paid for by a small import balance of services, and we balanced the 
account in the same abnormal way as in 1934 by delivering, against 
the bullion imports, $60,000,000 of long term securities, $560,000,000 
evidences of short term or demand debt and, as a final residual item, 
in which was absorbed all errors in the other estimates, $282,000,000 
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in obligations of various kinds created or surrendered by our citizens 
but not specifically identified by the Commerce Department. 
The sensational shrinkage in our cotton exports is probably the 
most disquieting single event in our recent economic history. From 
an export level during the crop year ended July 31, 1934, of 7,500,-
000 bales valued at $421,000,000 a drop occurred in the year ended 
July, 1935, to 4,800,000 bales valued at $326,000,000, while the per-
centage of American cotton used in total world consumption fell 
from 58.3% in the crop year 1933 to 53.7% in 1934 and to 44.4%4 
in 1935. 
Simultaneously the aggregate cash intake of our agricultural 
community through price advances and bounties has been substantially 
increased—60% or more as has been claimed—with resulting favor-
able effect on the sales and profits of industry generally. The Agri-
cultural Adjustment Administration does not hesitate to take credit 
for this improvement in general business as being the result of its 
crop restriction and price-fixing policies. 
The crop destruction policy of the A A A requires here only the 
passing comment that restriction of this kind through the erasure 
of tangible wealth already in being carries a shocking picture to the 
plain mind, which is unlikely ever to discover in such a waste any 
social justification. The more important major policy of holding 
millions of bales of cotton off an unregulated world market on gov-
ernment loans made at an uneconomically high price stands as one of 
the most costly attempts ever made to prove that the law of supply 
and demand has been abolished. 
Some part of the shrinkage of our cotton market in Germany 
has been attributed to difficulties experienced by manufacturers in 
obtaining dollar exchange. But the fact is that our cotton exports 
to Germany have fallen off more proportionately than our other ex-
ports to that country. It is also to be noted that the proportion of 
our total cotton exports to our total exports to all countries has 
dropped heavily, despite a substantial increase in the unit price of 
the exported cotton.5 These decreases in cotton exports, both abso-
lute and relative to other exports, are clearly traceable to a competi-
4 Preliminary figure. 
5 In the last six months of 1933 our cotton exports amounted to 25.4% of 
our total exports; the proportion fell in the two semi-annual periods of 1934 to 
17.6% and 16.8%, respectively, and in the first six months of 1935 to 13.9% of 
our total exports. At the same time the average price of cotton exported in-
creased from 7-7/10 cents a pound in the crop year ended July, 1933, to 10-6/10 
cents for 1934 and to 12-9/10 cents for 1935. 
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tive situation unfavorable to our growers. We are obviously facing 
a substantial permanent loss of former markets abroad to foreign 
cotton-growers who have been more realistic in their price policies. 
Thus it may accurately be said that the increased cash returns to the 
farmer have been realized by a large-scale dissipation of the capital 
assets of agriculture represented by market organization and customer 
relationships. 
It is suggested that the stimulus given to general business by the 
increased purchasing power of the farmer will prove to be the de-
termining factor in rolling up a great tide of national production, 
and that this tide will be so big that the unsoundness of an economic 
policy that cashes in on capital and calls it income will no longer 
matter. This is specious reasoning. It avoids the real point, which 
is that the calamitous government loan scheme was wholly unneces-
sary for the major purpose for which it was created. That purpose 
was to provide cash for the farmers, who in turn were to prime the 
pump for the nation at large. The taxpayers were to furnish the 
cash, and they did so, but why this was not done directly instead 
of through a foredoomed scheme of price maintenance on the world 
market is not explainable on any rational basis. 
The cotton catastrophe is the logical result of a scheme con-
ceived, though perhaps not consciously, in the true spirit of economic 
nationalism. The essence of the plan was the attempted imposition 
of a heavy tax on our foreign customers, and it ended up, as it was 
bound to end, by our having to put our own necks on the chopping 
block and hand over our business gratis to our competitors. Each 
generation has to learn for itself a good many painful lessons, be-
cause people won't take the trouble to read history. But we might 
at least take note of what is reported in the newspapers. Trying to 
go it alone in price-fixing and restriction schemes was already a 
notorious failure when the American Government tried it in cotton. 
It was only a few years ago that England had to abandon the Steven-
son rubber restriction scheme for British Malaya when its effect was 
seen to be to build up the rubber-growing industry in the Dutch East 
Indies and elsewhere. More recently, Brazil had a similar experi-
ence in coffee. In face of this, the A A A unsupported by any inter-
national restriction agreement cheerfully took on a finish fight with 
the law of supply and demand. The only plausible reason for this 
action is that it was the expression of a philosophy, at present much 
in favor, that regards as of no consequence all previous experience 
not personally participated in by ourselves. 
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Looking at the appalling complexity of the whole apparatus of 
the A A A , it is reasonable to suggest that there is such a thing as 
being too ingenious. We ought to ask ourselves whether there is 
no virtue left in the simple and direct approach to human problems. 
We ought to look the problem of the distress of our great farming 
community fairly in the face, call a spade a spade and a dole a dole 
and, pay it directly under that name. Why should we try to sugar-
coat the farmer's dole and overlay it with unworkable paraphernalia, 
at the risk of bringing down in ruins a great industry that was his 
birthright and has been the backbone of American economic life? 
Turning to other countries whose conditions and policies have an 
important influence on our own, we find that in Germany domestic 
business has been flourishing. But we are obliged to note that the 
activity has been based largely on that sinister and unproductive 
industry which is devoted to the manufacture of instruments of war, 
and which has been acquiring its imported raw materials in consid-
erable part by using funds withheld from foreign holders of German 
securities. While there is no reasonable doubt as to the fundamental 
power and vigor of the German national economy, the basis of the 
present activity is not. such as to carry any large degree of assurance 
for the immediate future. Looking at Italy, we find a distinctly un-
favorable position, with the country sliding steadily down into con-
ditions of financial crisis as a result of fiscal and monetary difficulties, 
and we observe a desperate effort being made by Signor Mussolini 
to rescue the nation from this precarious situation by taking a gam-
bler's chance on a war of conquest. In France and certain countries 
still associated with her in the gold bloc we see the governments still 
struggling to keep their monetary systems on the gold standard, and 
maintaining this position only at the cost of an economically painful 
and politically hazardous deflation, the outcome of which is still 
uncertain. 
Even the British, unsurpassed though they usually are in the de-
gree of intelligence, or at least of hard-headed equanimity with which 
they face their problems, have been trying to reconstruct their dom-
estic economy by substantial reliance on tariff barriers erected against 
old customers—a policy which would be observed with serious mis-
givings by their equally hard-headed forerunners who laid the founda-
tions of England's preeminence in the markets of the world. 
These recent movements and conditions in important occidental 
countries illustrate the world-wide vogue of the philosophy that re-
covery must be induced at home by whatever means and at whatever 
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cost. National leaders bear the unenviable responsibility of determi-
ning the point at which the means adopted carry more menace than 
reassurance and at which, in consequence, the probable costs become 
prohibitive. No judicious person will deny the difficulties of deter-
mining when the danger point has been reached and of then putting 
a stop to movements already under way, in the course of which new 
varieties of vested interests have arisen. Even those leaders rightly 
to be called statesmen fall far short of infallibility and they fre-
quently lack, as well, the necessary authority to act or power to per-
suade ; while in countries where fanatics or ambitious self-seekers are 
at the wheel the mass of uneducated opinion is swept blindly along 
past the red lights. 
The nationalistic doctrines that have recently dominated inter-
national relations have moved in two different planes, depending on 
their country of domicile. Almost everywhere they had an economic 
origin. They were born of economic stress. Especially in Germany 
and Italy, however, they have been translated into the sphere of high 
politics and explosive political action. It is a truism that the highly 
charged domestic political atmosphere produced by economic crises 
finds its easiest outlet by a violent discharge directed across the fron-
tier or against racial, religious or political minorities at home. Where 
this has happened, a species of emotional frenzy has been aroused, 
which will not submit to critical examination, much less to contra-
diction, and its disruptive effects have to be endured until the Frank-
enstein can be chained up again. 
But elsewhere, in those countries which have refrained from tak-
ing the easy way of finding an alien scapegoat, economic nationalism 
can still be combatted on its merits. It is true that the governments 
of free countries find the domestic political aspects of their economic 
problems all the more difficult from their having avoided the easy 
solution. It is a fact that political necessities are paramount in that 
area of human affairs known as economics—once much more accu-
rately called political economy. If these necessities are something 
more than organized group selfishness or self-serving inventions of 
the politicians, if in other words they are rooted in aspirations look-
ing to a better world for all and thus possess the authentic character 
of great political forces, there are few so-called economic laws that 
do not have to submit to being moulded by them. But many so-called 
political necessities are in fact pitched in the lowest plane of political 
expediency, and wherever a high general level of intelligence is 
found and free institutions are cherished, large bodies of independent 
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voters are sooner or later moved to give them something more than 
a casual scrutiny. Periodically despite the smoke screens of pres-
sure groups and office seekers, the independent voter puts national 
policies to the real test of their desirability and effectiveness from the 
standpoint of the nation as a whole. For one, I am willing to believe 
that that is what the independent voter in our own country tries to 
do at intervals of not longer than four years. 
In the United States today it is not political ideas having as 
their prime motivation any anti-foreign complex that are responsible 
for the existence of nationalistic economic doctrines. There is no 
considerable opinion here—certainly none of the dignity of a party 
or even bloc—that for reasons of crude race prejudice or domination 
demands the enforcement of policies destructive to the well-being of 
our neighbors. Nor is there any important body of such opinion in 
the countries of our sister democracies. The innumerable economic 
barriers of various kinds which nevertheless persist had a rational 
origin in the economic events of the crisis. 
The principal contribution of the United States to the present 
world-wide collection of economic strait-jackets is our failure to lend 
money abroad, as a creditor or exporting nation has to do in a normal 
world, or relinquish its role. The reasons back of this negative con-
tribution have been up to now perfectly correct. For, credit is not 
anything that the creditor can manufacture for his debtor; it is 
something that the debtor has to create for himself. And Europe, 
which is still the greatest factor in our international relations, has 
not yet created credit for itself. Indeed at the moment, Europe 
thinks so poorly of its own credit that it insists on sending us from 
week to week more and more millions of gold for safekeeping. The 
truth is that today the United States, and the United States alone, 
has more credit at home and abroad than we know what to do with. 
Abroad, the contributions to the economic tangle in the form of 
new or increased tariffs, import quotas, clearing agreements, and ex-
change controls, were erected in debtor countries largely as protection 
against imminent dangers to currency systems, precipitated by the 
collapse of prices, of trade and of credit. Most of these dangers were 
real, and to that extent and in so far as the measures taken were 
not unduly harsh, it is impossible to say that those countries in the 
critical circumstances which they faced had any practicable alternative. 
However this may be, our chief concern now is the prevalence 
of the view that the extreme nationalistic measures and attitudes fas-
tened on the world in a time of chaos have to be with us always— 
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that they are permanently desirable as expressions of a practical ideal. 
That ideal is fixed on the attainment of a substantially complete na-
tional self-sufficiency—of an exclusiveness of national life, which, 
wherever it is most favored, seems inevitably to tend toward racial 
intolerance and a consciously hostile attitude toward neighboring 
peoples. There are persons credulous enough to believe that mankind 
can live by spiritual sustenance of that low-grade variety and by de-
pendence on substituted materials, second-best machinery and syn-
thetic foods, and still maintain the standards of civilized society as 
we have- known them. 
The obstacles in the way of breaking down the barriers are a 
catalogue of all the desperate political and economic problems raised 
by the depression. Any proposed measures of amelioration, other 
than mere palliatives, are immediately brought squarely up against 
one central fact. That fact is that international trade as well as all 
the processes of our domestic economic life are enabled to operate 
healthily only through a proper and multilateral functioning of the 
credit system. At the bottom of our economic system there is, of 
course, its philosophical basis in the urge to survive and in the 
money-making motive, as well as the basic human factor of differences 
in individual aptitudes, which as translated into division of labor 
make possible diversified large-scale production. These primal bio-
logical factors being present, there remains the necessity of joining 
them up by the dynamic process that makes the system work. That 
process is the provision of capital for production and for moving 
•product to the market and to the consumer. That provision is 
effected only through the credit system. It therefore seems clear that 
an adequate flow of credit is the master key to the restoration of 
world prosperity. 
As long as domestic credit remains largely potential in our idle 
banking reserves and foreign long-term credit non-existent, respon-
sible leaders searching for the way to a better world are restricted to 
palliatives. The importance of such measures, however, in these times 
of slender material and psychological returns, should not be mini-
mized. There is hopeful significance in the reciprocal trade agree-
ments which have been sponsored under the Trade Agreements Act 
by our high-minded and understanding Secretary of State. Such 
agreements tend to make two blades of grass grow where previously 
there was but one and, by the extension of their benefits under the 
most favored nation clause, to permit international trade to resume its 
normal channels and magnitude. They should tend to relieve the 
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rigid canalization resulting from bilateral clearing agreements and 
other instruments of barter, the effect of which in the opinion of all 
competent authorities is to diminish trade and production and to 
force down commodity prices on the world market.6 By consistent 
development, indeed, of the new reciprocal trade policies it is felt 
by some that the way of escape from the present- strangulation may 
be found. 
On the other hand, there are some who believe that international 
stabilization of currencies is the basic remedy without which nothing 
can be accomplished. In my opinion, however, currency stabilization 
when it comes will be less a means to general economic stabilization 
than a reflection of such a condition at least measurably attained. 
There are strong indications that certain other things must and will 
precede permanent currency stabilization. 
Some who emphasize the desirability of an early return to gold 
and think it practicable are convinced that there must first be a 
formal revision of the war debts. This appears to me equivalent to 
saying that currency stabilization will be a long time deferred. From 
an observation of the war debts problem from its inception, in part 
at rather close range, I would hazard the opinion that any nice tidy 
legal document of revision, with all the seals attached and all the 
ratifications appended, will not be seen for a long time to come, if 
ever. But the assertion might also be risked that the American 
people have already mentally written the war debts off to profit and 
loss. It seems probable that the state of practical cancellation now 
existing will run along without much fresh exacerbation, and on the 
reasonable assumption that pending a new settlement there will be 
no further payments, it is clearly impossible that the debts can throw 
any strain on the monetary systems, whether stabilized or unstabilized, 
of our debtors. 
Despite the war debt defaults, it is a reasonable supposition that 
the United States will continue to do business with Europe, and that 
when the proper conditions arise, American capital, though avoiding 
the extension of credits to defaulting governments, will again flow 
through private channels to carefully selected areas in Europe and 
elsewhere, in order to finance on long term the export of our surplus 
production. That the United States will move for formal revisions 
of the debt settlements seems improbable, and any early attempt by 
Europe to obtain them would meet almost insuperable obstacles here. 
6 See "Enquiry Into Clearing Agreements," League of Nations, April , 1935. 
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If, however, our debtors hold the view that a final legal liquidation 
is a prerequisite of currency stabilization or of any other necessary 
phase of recovery, it will be for them to take the initiative and make 
concrete proposals which will in some perceptible degree do justice 
to the facts of history. 
The gold standard still holds the field as the only practicable 
international monetary system suitable for the orderly and profitable 
transaction of international business. The weight of opinion un-
doubtedly favors ultimate return to gold, though under some modified 
plan which will be free from objectionable features of the old scheme. 
What that new form should be, however, no one has yet been able 
to suggest with any widely accepted degree of authority. The diffi-
culty is that the stability we are seeking is of two contradictory kinds. 
If money is stable and prices are unstable you cannot manipulate 
prices into stability by monetary means without making money un-
stable. Under the gold standard there are to be expected periodical 
conflicts between the necessity for high interest rates to check the 
outflow of gold reserves and the advisability of low interest rates for 
the promotion of domestic business. It is true that the theory of the 
gold standard furnishes an answer to this difficulty, for in theory 
high discount rates tend to attract gold from abroad and the result 
of that influx is to make domestic credit easier. 
Thus the gold standard seems to offer its own automatic checks 
and compensations. As a practical matter, however, the British 
Chancellor of the Exchequer and other monetary authorities abroad 
appear extremely reluctant to place themselves at the mercy of a 
theory. They are unwilling to run the risk that if credit has to 
be tightened to protect the currency reserves, the compensating re-
verse movement will in practice work freely enough or rapidly enough 
to save domestic business from serious recession. Moreover, if the 
theory did work, it would do so through the influx of international 
short term money, which in itself offers another cause of serious 
concern. Monetary experts have been trying, so far without notable 
success, to discover some method of control which will retain the 
advantages of the international fluidity of short term money and at 
the same time minimize its dangers. The importance of the question 
appears from the well-known fact, among others, that England was 
forced off gold in 1931 by the sudden withdrawal by foreigners of 
large short term credits which had been running in the London mar-
ket. It is true that England might have reserved against this con-
tingency by keeping liquid her own large balances abroad. But her 
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banking machinery for the placing of long term loans abroad was 
working too well, and so it is that today the British mind still views 
with acute misgivings the possibility under a restored gold standard 
of again having suddenly to liquidate large deposits held on demand 
for foreigners. 
The British see other objections to tying up to gold, related like 
the one just mentioned to their present difficulty of maintaining a 
credit balance on their international current account. Until, there-
fore, the situation of England's export industries shows substantial 
improvement or until as a less probable alternative her whole eco-
nomic structure is transformed, it seems useless to expect the con-
currence of England in a permanent stabilization of currencies; and 
without British participation a return to the international gold stand-
ard is out of the question. 
If in a rash moment I were to join the decimated ranks of the 
prophets, I would suggest the likelihood of a certain general sequence 
of events leading back to a healthy functioning of the international 
system. Given the close and rapid interaction of economic forces, 
nothing is of course more baffling than the question of what comes 
first—of what is cause and what is effect. I reason, however, that 
credit directly underlies the operation of all systems of money and 
exchange, and that the fundamental basis of an adequate international 
credit structure resides in a reasonable measure of political stability. 
The unanswerable riddle seems to be that while prosperity comes with 
political stability, the latter in turn depends on prosperity. But that 
riddle, seeming to defy solution by logic, has never yet failed of solution 
in practice. On the economic interpretation of history, political stability 
has habitually been regained by the gradual restoration of productivity, 
induced by the wide, persistent pressure of millions of individual hu-
man beings, tired of strife, determined to survive and ingenious in 
their efforts to find the way to make a decent living. 
By whatever means induced, such a restoration is now under 
way in many areas. Assuming that a solution of the Anglo-Italian 
crisis will be found, it is not unreasonable to believe that the improve-
ment in production will continue and that it will have a steadily in-
creasing influence in easing the tensions of the political storm areas. 
Especially is this healing process going forward in this country, 
more highly favored as we are by the absence of intense population 
pressure and. by the possession of a strong tradition of free institu-
tions. The upward movement in the United States is the important 
thing. Our returning prosperity, in my view, will be the determining 
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factor in promoting better conditions abroad, in loosening trade 
barriers and finally in lifting the world definitely out of its misery. 
And in turn as the tensions are eased abroad and the barriers loosened 
our own recovery will thereby be accelerated. 
Thus the unmistakable signs of domestic recovery in the United 
States seem to mark the turn of the nationalistic tide. We should 
be thankful if this is so, for there are few nations that stand to gain 
less than this country by economic nationalism, as we may plainly 
see by the disproportionately unfavorable effects on us, in our position 
as a creditor and exporting nation, of the world-wide restrictions on 
the free movement of trade. We have been witnessing a conflict not 
primarily between nation and nation but a clash of ideas which has 
cut across boundary lines and divided each nation, if not into two 
camps, at least into two schools. One school holds the view that 
economic society functions in a world market place and draws its 
sustenance in considerable part from national specialization and divi-
sion of labor and from the exchange of the fruits of that specialization. 
The other idea is that the world can be and should be an unorganized 
collection of isolated national units, each sufficient to itself. In the 
realm of action there is a similar clash of forces. The forces of na-
tionalism work against the trend of science and of evolutionary 
thought. The forces of internationalism, on the other hand, are the 
irrepressible forces of a society which all the way down to the in-
dividual has always lived by division of labor, co-operation and ex-
change. Man was lifted out of the stone age by his recognition of 
this basic evolutionary principle, and by following it through the 
centuries he has achieved standards of physical comfort and spiritual 
satisfaction unattainable by the cave-dweller. 
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